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ADMIRALTY.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently
decided that the sole essentials of Admiralty jurisdiction in a
suit in rew for breach of contract, are that the
Suit in Rein

contract is maritime and the property proceeded

against is within the lawful custody of the court:
The Resolute, 18 Sup. Ct, Rep. IT2, In this case there was
an appeal from the District Court of Oregon upon the question
of its jurisdiction, and it was contended that proceedings in
rem being necessarily founded on liens, the absence of a lien
would deprive that court of jurisdiction. This was held to
be a question of the merits, to be decided by the District
Court. A portion of libellant's claim in this case arose under
an assignment of a seaman's wages, so the question sent back
to the District Court is certainly not free from difficulty, and
it will be interesting to see upon which side of that controversy the court will declare itself. Another case coming up
in the same way, The Three Sisters, Ibid. I14, involved the
question of a master's lien for his wages, where the reason for
denying it, namely, his right to handle the freight, was absent,
the property having been in the hands of a receiver, who took
charge of all collections and disbursewents. This case was
also sent back to the District Court, its jurisdiction to decide
the questions involved being sustained.
An excellent review of the " rules of the road" is to be
found in the case of The Victoy, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 149. In
Negligence, the opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, there is
Burden of

a very good statement of a general principle: "As

Proof
between these vessels, the fault of 'The Victory'
being obvious and inexcusable, the evidence to establish fault
on the part of the 'Plymothian' must be clear and convincing, in order to make a case for apportionment. The
burden of proof is upon each vessel to establish fault on the
part of the other."

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

ADMIRALTY (Continued).

Sailing vessels are too apt to feel that, because they have
the right of way over steamers, they are under no obligation
to keep a careful lookout, or otherwise to guard
sailing Rules, against collision. A wholesome decision has been
Negligence
rendered by Judge Brown, of the Rhode Island
District Court, in the case of The General, 82 Fed. 83o.
In
this case the owner of the injured sloop, although seeing
" The General " brilliantly lighted at least a mile and a half
away, held a course that intersected that of the steamer, and
paid so little attention that he discovered its dangerous proximity, on looking out under his boom, when but forty feet
away. The learned judge very properly characterized this
conduct as " a grave fault," and dismissed the libel.
AGENCY.

An agent for the sale of bonds of a railroad company is
entitled to commissions upon a sale made by him, though the
purchaser refused to take the bonds on the ground
Commission
Sale of Bonds (as was subsequently held) that they were illegal;
the agent has a right to presume that they are
legal : Berg v. San Antonio St. Railway Co., 42 S. W. (Tex.)
647.
The somewhat lengthy opinion in Cross v. Atchison, T. &
S. F Ry. Co., 42 S. W. (Mo.), 675 can, perhaps, be reduced
Contract,

to the simple proposition that a defendant who in

his answer has admitted the making of a contract,
simply disputing as to its terms, cannot upon trial
show that it never made the contract, because its supposed
agent had not the requisite authority.
It hardly needs authority to show that one who deals with
A., supposing him to be a member of the firm of
Mistake,
Terms,
Authority

Set-off

B. & Co., cannot set off A.'s indebtedness to him,

in a suit against him by B. & Co., if, as a matter
of fact, A. was not a member of the firm: Grffitkl v. Kroeger,
42 S. W. (Tex.) 772.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Northern District of California, has decided in Graham v. Earl, 82
Fed. 737, what is a very interesting question in
Patent,
Infringement, regai-d to the law governing the rights of patenLiabilityof
tees. It holds that a resident manager, engaged
Z
Agent
in leasing to others an infringing fruit car, owned
by his non-resident principals, is himself liable as an infringer,
though he receives a regular salary, and no commissions, and

PROGRESS

OF ThE LAW.

AGENCY (Continued).
has no interest in the business. This is in harmony with the
rule which is applied to private corporations: that all who
engage in the infringement, whether directors, officers, agents
or servants, are personally answerable to the patentee.
An agent who had acted as such for many years, and who
was held out as agent, coit-rac-ted to- sell land on behalf of
his principal to the defendatit at a price less than
Unauthorized that for which he was authorized to sell it.
The
Agent,
contract of sale contained certain conditions requiroccu"IjtIo, ing the defendant to make improvements, and the
Betterient defendant entered and made such improvements in
good faith, and without knowledge of the fact that the agent
had exceeded his authority.
In an action to rescind, the defendant conceded the plaintiff's
right to recover the property, bitt it was held that he was
entitled to payment for the improvements he had erected upon
the property in good faith Van Zaoidt v. Branitlej', 42 S. W.
(Tex.) 6 t7.
ASSIGNMENTS.

It is the duty of an assignee for auditors to realize as much
as possible for creditors. But in the absence of
a statute requiring the property to be sold in
Liability
parcels, he is not liable for loss resulting from his
honest opinion that the property would bring more if sold en
masse: itre Xchols' Estale, 50 Pac. (Cal.) 1072.
In Minnesota an insolvent man may apparently, by very
similar instruments, make an assignment for creditors or declare
himself an insolvent. In case he does the former,
however, the court cannot compel his creditors to
sign releases: An i-c
re ossifin, 73 N. W. (Minn.) 146.
Assignee,

CARRIERS.

A railroad company shipped goods to B., the destination
being a station at which the company had no building nor
agent. The bill of lading contained the following
Negligence provision: "When merchandise is destined to or
from any way stations and platforms where station
buildings have not been established by the carrier, or where
there are no regularly appointed freight agents, it shall be at
the risk of the owner until loaded into the cars, and when
unloaded therefrom; and when received from or delivered on
private turnouts, it shall be at the owner's risk until cars are
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attached to, and after they are detached from the train." The
goods were delivered by the railroad company by depositing the
same on a platform, a storm being in progress at the time,
and were not protected by the company from the weather.
Held that the contract as manifested by the bill of lading was
valid; and that the company was not guilty of negligence in
the delivery: Allam v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 38 Atl.
709.

In Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Sherbert 42 S. W. 639, a woman
who bought a first-class railroad ticket was compelled to
travel in the same coach with drunken men, who
Passengers,
Measure of

swore, smoked, sung ribald

songs, and

fired

pistols in the coach.
She complained to the
conductor who gave her no relief. The Supreme Court of
Texas held that a verdict rendered in the District Court against
the company for $5o0 damages was not excessive.
Damage

A person 'who, without a ticket, boards a passenger train,
prepared to pay his fare, and with a bonafide intention of so
doing, is not a passenger if he takes passage on
Who are
Passengers a part of the train not intended for passengers
JiMlssouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. TWilliams,
42 S. W. (Tex.) 855.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAV.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has decided that an
Act providing for the summary appraisal and destruction of
" Due Process horses afflicted with glanders, and for the payment
to their owner by the county of their appraised
of Law,"
Diseased
value, does not conflict with art. I. of the State
Horses,

Destruction

Constitution, which declares that " No citizen shall
be deprived of life, liberty, property . . . except

by due course of the law of the land;" nor with sec. I of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which prohibits the states from depriving " any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law:"
Chambers v. Gilbert, 42 S. W. 630.
It has been recently decided in Catlingv. Kansas City StockYards Co., 82 Fed. 839, that neither the Act of Congress
Interstate

Commerce,

conderning the unloading of live stock for feeding,

watering and resting (Rev. St.

§§ 4386-88), nor

Stock Yards, the Act of May 27, 1884, to prevent the exportaRegulation tion of diseased cattle (23 St. 3 i), nor the Act of

March 3, i89i, in reference to the inspection of cattle, sheep
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and hogs which are the subjects of interstate commerce (26
Stat. io89), are of such nature is to show that Congress has
assumed exclusive regulation of interstate commerce in live
stock, so as to debar a state legislature from prescribing reasonable maximum charges and other regulations in respect to the
yarding, feeding, care and sale of such stock by a stock-yard
company.
The next issue will contain a note as to the case of the
City of Maysville v. M"/1o1, 42 S. W. 754, where the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has granted a new trial in a
Lottery,
License,
case where the plaintiff obtained a verdict for a
Vested Rights sum of money paid the defendant, a municipal
corporation, for a license to conduct a lottery, the plaintiff
knowing that such licenses were illegal but asserting that he
had a vested right to conduct a lottery of which the state
could not deprive him.
CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of California has recently decided that
when A. niade a contract with B. for the purchase of several
articles at prices expressly apportioned to the
Abandonment.
several items, and paid money thereon, which
Forfeiture
B. receipted for " on account," a refusal of one
article of the purchase wits not such an abandonment of
the contract as to work a forfeiture of the amount paid:
Her.og v. Pttrdi', 51 Pac. 27.
In hjB'dlo & L. Land Co. v. ld/vier Land and Inproavement
69., 47 N. Y. Suppl. 72 1, the Supreme Court of New York
has purported to follow the rule of the Supreme
Street
Railways,
Court of the United States in Del-nott v. Jones,
Specific
2 Wallace, 7 (1867), to the effect that unforseen
Performance,
Operation of difficulties, however great, will not excuse one
Cars
from performing an act which he has expressly
undertaken to perform.
In the New York case a company owning a tract of land
near a city, agreed with another company, formed to purchase it, to construct and operate an electric road from said
land and connect it with the city " and operate its cars as often
as once every half hour from 7 a. m. to 8 p. in." Another
clause of the contract stipulated that on failure to run the cars
it would restore the purchaser to the position occupied by it
when the contract was made and pay $5ooo as liquidated
damages. The street railway company was prevented from
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running its cars during several days on account of an unprecedented fall of snow. There was no wilful neglect on its
part, and yet the court compelled the company to a specific
performance of the alternative covenants of the contract. It
is submitted that the case is open to criticism. There is no
disposition to question the soundness of that rule of law
which requires a man to perform his contracts or take the
consequences no matter how difficult the performance may be,
provided there has been no mutual mistake as to the existence
of the subject-matter of the contract at the time when the
contract was made. That the contract in this case, however,
was to run a car every half hour, convulsions of nature and
heavy falls of snow to the contrary notwithstanding, may be
seriously questioned. In the case mainly relied on by the
court, that of McDermott v. Jones, the house which a builder
had agreed to build so as to be a safe house became uninhabitable because of the inherent quality of the soil. These
qualities, however, existed at the time the contract was made.
It was not made subsequently impossible of performance by
an act of God or the public enemy. The law should be
careful not to read into ordinary business contracts a stipulation in the nature of an agreement of insurance. For thi.s
case the court made the parties who undertook to run the
street cars say that if they failed to run a single car agreed
upon, at any time in the future, no matter how heavy the fall
of snow, or whether a torrent of rain washed away their
tracks, they would be obliged to pay damages out of all
proportion to the loss to the covenantee. That anyone in
his senses would enter into such a contract and spend a large
sum of money thereunder seems past belief.
CORPORATIONS.

Following National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 627 (1878),
the Supreme Court of Michigan has just decided that a corCorporate poration cannot resist a foreclosure suit on the
Power,
ground that the giving of the mortgage was ultra
Mortgage, vires. In the Federal case, it will be remembered,
Foreclosure it was the taking of the mortgage that was
expressly prohibited and the bank was the plaintiff in the
foreclosure. In the present case the corporation defendant
was the mortgagor. The court admits that the giving of the
mortgage was "in excess of the powers defined" but is of
opinion that the state alone can complain as all the stock-
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holders acquiesced. Upon the doctrine of general capacities
the result reached is most satisfactory. On the doctrine of
special capacities, to which the court seems to adhere, it is on
principle impossible to sustain the decision: Butterworthi &
Lowe v. .Kitzer Milling Co., 72 N. W. 99 o .
In People v. ReclamationDisfiHr,5 aP. ro6&, tIeSuprre
Court of California has reasserted the familiar rule
Franchise,
Usurpation, that the state is not estopped by lapse of time and
the corporation's change of position from proEstoppel
ceeding to oust the defendant from the exercise of a usurped
franchise.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has been called upon,
during the last few years, to pass upon a good many interesting questions in regard to the liability of stockStock Dis.
There was first
posed of at holders to corporate creditors.
Less than the decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Gustin Mining
Par,
Creditor's
Rights

Co., 42 Minn. 327, and then Horpes v. Car Co., 48
Minn. 174, and HastingMalting Co. v. Iron Range
Brewing Co., 65 Minn. 28. The same court has just decided
in Wallace v. Carpenter Electric Heating Mfg. Co., 73 N. W.
i89, that Section 3415 Gen'l St, of 1894 does not authorize
manufacturing or other corporations to issue their capital stock
as paid up when it is not so in fact. The court, accordingly,
compelled a stockholder to respond for the difference between
par and the amount actually paid, and declared that if the
defendant wished to avail himself of the rights of a bonafide
purchaser he must prove his equity instead of standing upon
the bare fact-that he was not an original subscriber.
An interesting questicn is raised *by Sowles v. Nationtal
Union Bank, 82 Fed. 696. It there appeared that an attadhment had been levied upon stock in a national
Stock in
Nation'al Bank, -bank standing 'in the name of the execution
Levy of
Attachment debtor. The ittachment'was adjudged'invalid on
the ground that the state statute authorizing the
under
state Ltws attachment -of stock did not apply in terms to
national banks. The court seemed to think that, even if the
statute did in terms cover the case, it would be inoperative as
dealing with a subject wholly within the Federal jurisdiction.
Sed qure.
Cullen v. Coal Creek Min.-& Mfg. Co., 42 S. W. 693, presents an interesting application of the principle that laches
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Unauthorized
Acts,

Right of
Stockholder
to Restrain

may constitute a bar to a stockholder's assertion

of right to impeach an unauthorized transaction.
The directors, with the sanction of the majority
stock, had consummated a purchase of the stock
of another corporation. This purchase, the court

conceded, was ultra vires. Some nine years afterward the
plaintiff, a minority stockholder, filed a bill asking an accounting from the defendant directors, and praying that they be
held personally liable for the sums spent in the unauthorized
purchase of stocks. The bill was dismissed upon demurrer.
The court relied upon the obvious distinction between a proceeding involving the public relation of the corporation to the
state and one involving the partnership rights of stockholders.
In the former case lapse of time is immaterial. In the latter
it may operate to bar private rights.
FQUITY.

The rule of law that a court of equity will not convert an
imperfect gift into a declaration of trust is too well settled to
be open to question. Sometimes, however, one
Trust,
Declarationof, may doubt the propriety of the application of the
Sufficiency rule to a particular case because the gift was not
imperfect. A case in the Supreme Court of New York, Gannon v. McGuire, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 870, was this: A. desired to
give a house and lot to B. free of all incumbrance, except a
particular incumbrance, which did not enter into the case. A.
brought the deeds of the land to B., and at the same time a
bond and mortgage, which he said was also to be asked to
take back from B. against his will. He said he protested, as
he wanted her to have the house free of all encumbrances,
and that it was a mere matter of form. B., under these circumstances, executed the bond and mortgage and handed
them to A. A. handed them to B. B. again handed them
to A., with the understanding that he should deposit them in
a place of safe keeping, so that when she died B. should have
the property clear. On A.'s death the court held that this
transaction imounted to a valid mortgage, of which there had
been an imperfect gift, which could not now be executed as a
trust.
The questions which naturally arise in one's mind, on
reading the case, are: First, was not the bond and mortgage
executed by B. under a misapprehension which invalidated it
as between the parties? Second, granted that there was a
valid mortgage, was not the delivery of the mortgage by A.
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to B. a sufficient gift, and did not the redelivery by B. to A.
amount to a delivery in trust for A.'s benefit during A.'s life,
and, on A.'s death, back to B. ?
BVIDENCE.

In Farmer v. State. 28 !. 'E. 26, the Supreme -Court of
Georgia affirm the earlier case, Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377
Admission by (i892), in which it was decided that an admission
Counsel,
in the pleadings in one civil suit is admissible in
Criminal Suit another civil suit, but hold that such an admission
is not evidence in a subsequent criminal suit unless it is
shown that the accused authorized his counsel to make such
admission.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recently decided that
a detailed and circumstantial confession of guilt made by the
prisoner before his arrest, and while "somewhat
Confession,
Intoxication intoxicated," was admissible even though he had
subsequently, while incarcerated, denied the truth of the
statement: Leach v. State, 42 S. W. 195.
In a recent fraud case the New York Supreme Court affirms
two well-known rules : First, the one which requires proof of
conspirators, the existence of a conspiracy and of the defendant's
Statements connection with it before statements of others are
admissible; and, second, that which renders inadmissible
statements of a co-conspirator made after the transaction and
not accompanying any act in connection with it: Douglas v.
McDermott, el al., 47 N. Y. Suppl. 336.
In State v. Carrington, 50 Pac. 526, the prisoner, a physician, was charged with murder, death having followed a
criminal operation intended to produce an aborDying
Declaration, tion. Deceased, in her dying declaration, stated
Opinion of that the prisoner had performed the operation and
Declarant
the purpose of it. The Supreme Court of Utah
held that only that part of the declaration was admissible
which stated the act, and that the reason or purpose could not
be proven in this way, saying, "Nothing can be evidence in a
declaration in articulo inortis that would not be so if the party
were sworn . . . anything the murdered person in ariculo
mortis says as to the facts is receivable, but not that which
he says as matters of opinion or belief."
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In Pittsburgh, Etc., Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 82 Fed. 720, the
Circuit Court of Appeals (N. D. Ohio) decides that while a
jury's finding that a man is insane, and his subseInsanity,
Witness,
quent commitment to an asylum are przmafacie
Incompetency evidence of his incompetency as a witness; this is
not conclusive, and if it appears that "his evidence is clear,
coherent and consistent there is no error in admitting it."
In a suit for the death of plaintiff's husband, by reason of
the negligence of the defendant, the mortuary tables were
Mortuary

admitted in connection with the other testimony,

as evidence of the probable duration of decedent's
Upon appeal the ruling was sustained: Galveston, Etc.,

Tables

life.

R. R. v. Bennett, 42 (Tex.) S. W. 314 (1897).

An interesting case, treating of the enforced disclosure of
facts obtained while acting on behalf of the executive branch
Revenue

of the

government, has been decided by the

United States Court of the Vermont District.
The State of Vermont had passed an Act punishing common liquor sellers and declaring that "the
payment of the United States special tax as a
liquor seller shall be held to be primafade evidence" of the
commission of the offence. In the trial of an indictment
under the Act, the deputy collector in Vermont was summoned
to appear as a witness and to produce the revenue books
which would show payment of the tax by the accused. The
collector, in accordance with instructions from his superiors,
refused so to do, and was committed for contempt by the
Vermont court. Upon habeas corp us proceedings in the
Federal court he was, however, released, and it was held that
his action was justified and said, "The state has no right to
Federal instruments of purely Federal character, for proof,
unless they are left within its reach, and these are not, but are
put without that reach:" In re Weeks, 82 Fed. 729.
Books,
Trial,
State Court,
Production

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

It is doubtless the fault of the legislature, which might easily
avoid any doubt on the subject, that the question so often
married women's
Ante-nuptial arises whether the modern
Debts,
statiites impliedly relieve the husband, who is no
Liability
longer entitled to his wife's property, of his liability for her ante-nuptial debts. Kies v. Young, 42 S. W.
(Ark.) 669, is the most recent instance, the court there holding the husband liable on the ground that the unity of hus-
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band and wife and many of the advantages of the husband
still continue, Bunn, C. J., dissents.
A decree for alimony will not be enforced against a man
who is unable to pay because he has no employDivorce,
ment, even though he has made no effort to
Alimony
obtain any: fn re Todd, 50 Pac. (Cal.) 307i.
A wife has no reason to leave her husband on account of
a quarrel; and her refusal to return for two years,
in spite of his repeated requests, will entitle him
Dv re,
to a divbrce on the ground of her desertion:
Whelan v. Whelan, 38 Atl. (Pa.) 625.
A statute provided for a divorce where " either husband or
wife is guilty of excesses, cruel treatment or outrages to the
other, if such ill-treatment is of such a nature as
Divorce,
Groundsfor, to render their living together insupportable,"
Ill-treatment Held, that wife was not entitled to divorce because
husband was "financially a failure," or because her husband
had expressed his suspicion when she refused to tell him
where she had been at night: Loring v, Lorig, 42 S. W.
(Tex.) 642,
In a prosecution for being a disorderly person in not supporting his wife, defendant may show that he has
Duty of
been relieved from that duty by her adultery:
Support,
People v. Bliskey, 47 N. Y. Suppl, 974.
Adultery
A man died, leaving a considerable sum in trust for the
widow during her life time; she became a lunatic, and R. was
estate. Held, that he
Insanity of appointed committee of her
should have claimed from the trustees the income
Wife,
due her, and is therefore not entitled to credits in
Duty of
Committee his accounts for payments made out of her
separate estate, which should have been made out of the
trust estate: In re Knapps .. state, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 97 I.
Under the New York statute authorizing a separation for
"cruel and inhuman treatment," verbal as opposed
Grounds for to physical abuse is sufficient to entitle the
wife to a judgment: Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick,47
N. Y. Suppl. 737.
INSOLVENCY.

One of the good points of modern New Jersey law is its
prohibition of preference of creditors of a corporation by
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Insolvent
Corporations,

means of confession of judgment.

This law was

equitably interpreted in Consolidated Coal Co. v.

Preferences National State Bank of Camden, 38 Atl. (N. J.)
657, where it was held that though there was no dishonest
intention in giving the bond and warrant when the company
was solvent, yet the entry of the notes just before the company's insolvency was an unlawful preference under the act.

INSURANCE.

A life insurance company, setting up by way of defence a
breach of the insured's warranty that he had never been
treated for certain diseases, may be required to
Bill of
Particulars,
specify in a bill of particulars the time or times of
Practice
such treatment. It is too much, however, to ask
where and by whom-the place is immaterial and to give the
names would indicate to the plaintiff what witnesses the
defendant would call : Richter et al. v. Equitable L. A. S.'oc. of
the U. S., 47 N. Y. SuppI. 763.
Roche v. Supreme Lodge, K. of H., 47 N. Y. Suppl. 774,
comes almost within the animadversions of Chief Justice Doe
in DA Lancei , v. Rockingham JI L. J. Co., 52 N. H.
arrany, 58i (1872.) The insured was asked how long
" Good
since he had been attended by a physician or had
Health"
professionally consulted one, and for what disease.
He answered, " not for two years.
Cold."
He
had in fact consulted a physician only a few months before,
on account of a trifling attack of rheumatism. It was held
error to charge that the consultation was immaterial "if the
medical attendance was for some affair so trifling as not to
come within the definition of disease to be located by a physician."
The Supreme Court points out that disease has nothing to do with the question: The physician might discover
that the supposed disease did not exist. Do beneficial societies wish to examine into the imaginative qualities of their
applicants for membership, when they require such information as this ?
While this decision is without doubt technically right, a
more reasonable-view of the relation of the parties is found in
Manhattan L. I. Co. v. Carder,82 Fed. 986. The policy was
to become operative only if issued and accepted " during the
good health of the insured."
It was delivered to him when
the company's physician found him in bed, suffering from a
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mild attack of gastritis. This disease, it appeared, is not
necessarily dangerous and seldom or never fatal.
The court held the term "in good health" comparative
and ruled that this clause need not avoid the policy unless
the malady from which the applicant suffered threatened his
life or would at least have some bearing on his general health.
The company's agents (see 11far o Ins. 387), moreover,
had acted within the apparent scope of their authority, but in
violation of their instructions. The company was of course
held bound by their acts, having clothed them with all the
indicia of authority.
A wife insured her husband's life without his knowledge for
her own benefit, and used his money to pay the premiums.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held the
Ignorance
of the
husband entitled to recover his money from the
Insured
insurance company: MAetropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Monahan, 42 S. W. 924.
The case is noticeable chiefly for the danger the court
apprehends in insurance effected without the knowledge of the
insured. The subject of insurable interest in the life of
another has been examined at length in this magazine (Vol.
44, page 16t, March, 1896), and attention was there directed
to the dangers the courts found in gambling contracts. (See,
e.g., Gilbert v. iktoose, IO4 Pa. 74, 1883.) Such contracts
were at one time so flagrant as to be called ' graveyard
insurance; " in cases of this nature, the insured's ignorance of
the policy was considered persdasive evidence of a conspiracy
to defraud and, perhaps, to commit murder.
But every insurance on life is, in its essence, a wager and a
,temptation; public policy, therefore, requires a sufficient
counter-vailing influence, called an insurable interest. Such
an interest a wife is always considered to have in her husband's
life, at once pecuniary and based on the closest ties of relationship. To insist upon his knowledge of her insurance is to
super-add a requirement at once novel and, it would seem,
needless.
MASTER AND SEIVANT.

In St. Louis, . M. & S. Ry, Co. v. .athlews, 42 S.W.
(Ark.) 9o2, the court was, perhaps, right in holding that an
agreement in a contract that employes should be
Contract
not to disdischarged only for catise is not equivalent to* an
charge,
agreement to employ a servant indefinitely. But
Interpretation is the court right in its reason, viz,, that
the com-
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pany cannot be bound by such a contract, if made, unless the
employe is similarly bound-in other words, that the plaintiff
has not agreed to serve for any stipulated time, and, consequently, there is no contract? Bunn, C. J.'s, dissent will
have many supporters.
The reason suggested above, as the true reason, finds support in a late case in a prominent jurisdiction: Carig v. Car,
46 N. E. (Mass.) 117 (1897). But it must be admitted that
the reason advanced by the court finds countenance in some
authorities. Wood, on Master and Servant, says: "When the
continuance of the term of service by contract of hiring is in
any manner left discretionary with either party, either may
put an end thereto at any time ;" or, as said by others, in an
executory contract both parties must be bound, because if
only one is bound there is no consideration for his promise:
Lawson on Contracts; King v. Warfield, 67 Md. 246 (1887);
R. R. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240 (1870); Canipbell v. Lambert, 36
La. Ann. 35 (1884); R. R. v. Scott, io S. W. 99 (1889.). It
would follow, however, from this line of reasoning, that if the
plaintiff in the principal case could have shown any consideration advanced by him for the option he held-such, for example, as the abandonment of position-that the decision of
the court would have been different.
MORTGAGES.

A bonafide purchaser for value without notice and who has
obtained declarations of no set-off from the mortgagor and
Assignment, also his assignor, is entitled to all the protection
B'onafide
the law can give him: so thought the court in
Purchaser Wallacit v. Schulze, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 936, where
in a foreclosure suit by such.purchaser the court held that
a subsequent judgment creditor of the mortgagor could not
successfully show -that a previous assignment of the mortgage
was really intended by the parties (including -the mortgagor)
as'a satisfaction thereof.
As an interesting exception to what one would suppose to
be an invariable rule of law, the assignee of a 'buildihg
ass{ciation -niay 'immediately proceed 'by foreBuilhTig
Asi6dtakioh, 'dl6stire to sue out mortgages on which there has
Right of
'been no default whatever: qucre, why should the
Assignee
necessity of immediate winding up of the company's affairs deprive the borrower of his contract
Weir v. Granite State Ass'n, 38 Atl. (N. J.) 643.

ights ?
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A mortgage covering both realty and chattels was made on
September 2, 1896, but not filed as a chattel mortgage until
2d Rev. Stat. of New
Chattels and September 30, 1896.
Realty,
York, page 137, sec. I, provided that the question
Partial
of fraudulent intent in cases of conveyance of
Invalidity
realty shall be deemed a question of fact. The
laws of New York, 1833, chapter z7r sec. t, declarer that an
unfiled mortgage of chattels not accompanied by immediate
delivery is void as against creditors. It was held that the
mortgage in question might be good as to the real estate,
although void as to the chattels by virtue of the last cited
statute, and that the principal, " void in part, void in 1oto, " had
no application to the question: Chemung Canal Bank v.
Payne, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 877.
A wife's joining in a mortgage of her husband's estate is
Estoppel, not in itself a warranty that the instrument is a
Warranty
first mortgage, nor will she be afterwards debarred
thereby from asserting her own .prior mortgage: Hewett v.
Suits, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 1038.
A referee appointed under the New York practice, to conduct a foreclosure sale, promised defendant's attorney a postForeclosure ponement of ten days from the appointed sale,
Sales,
and, nevertheless, sold the property on the apPostponement pointed day. Held, sale must be set aside upon
application of defendant, and innocent purchaser is protected
by an order reimbursing him for proper expenses out of the
next sale: Angel v. Clark, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 73 1.
The Court of Civil Appeals in Texas, following the previous decisions in that state, has held that a lessee from a
mortgagor in possession has a right to the growLessee,
Growing
ing crops on the premises as against a purchaser
Crops
at foreclosure sale, and, as a consequence, has a
right of ingress and egress to gather and market such crops
even after foreclosure sale, and even though when the lease
was created the lessee had notice of the mortgage by the fact
of its record : Bro-w'n v. Leath, 42 S.W. 655.
By the Washington code a mortgage of personal property
is void as against creditors, unless accompanied by an affidavit
of good faith; by the constitution of the same state
Railroad
mortgage, rolling stock of a railroad is personal property,
Personalty and liable to execution as such. It follows that
a railroad mortgage, with no special affidavit, is void as to
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subsequent judgment creditors so far as the rolling stock is
concerned : Illinois Bank v. Seattle Electric Co., 82 Fed. 936.
A purchaser of land subject to a mortgage cannot dispute
Subsequent its validity, so held in New Prague Milling Co.
The court
Purchaser, V. Schreiner, 72 N. W. (Minn.) 963.
Right to
differed as to whether the assignee of a mortgagor
Dispute
had by such a sale deprived himself of the right
to claim that the mortgage was void as to creditors.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

The liability of an irregular indorser of a negotiable instrument is almost as varied as the jurisdictions in which that
Irregular

liability has been determined.

The Supreme Court

of Arkansas has recently decided that the irregular
indorsement of a certificate of deposit, there being
no evidence as to anything being said or done by the indorser
at the time of indorsement, or that it was not made before
delivery to the payee, renders the indorser liable as a joint
maker: Scanland vs. Porter,42 S. W. 897. For the authorities on this subject see Ames' Cases on Bills and Notes, vol.
indorser,
Liability

I, page 269.

The Court of Appeals of Colorado have held, upon the
Promissory
Note,

analogy of the presumption as to the date of an

indorsement, that an agreement for the extension

Alteration,

Presumption of a negotiable instrument, indorsed upon its back,

is presumed to have been made prior to the maturity thereof: St. Joe and Xii F. Coonsol. 1f. Co. v. Bank, 50
of Time

Pac. 1055.

Kline v. Jesse, 72 N. W. (Neb.) Io5o Although the material alteration of a mortgage, without the consent of the
Promissory

mortgagor, may avoid the same, yet such altera-

Note,

tion cannot affect a note, the maker of which was
the mortgagor, and for which the mortgage was

Collateral,

Alteration,
Effect

security.

The reasoning of the court, that the

creditor has two concurrent remedies-one on the

note, the other on the mortgage, and the destruction of one
cannot affect the, other-hardly seems convincing. Is not the
real reason that the debtor's position has not changed to his
disadvantage by the act of the creditor? If it had, it is submitted a contrary result should have been reached, as in
Alderson v. Langdal, 3 B. and Ad. 66o (1832).
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In Bank v. Vaughan, 73 N. W. 143, the Supreme Court of
Michigan has decided that, in the case of a note payable on
demand, no presentment is necessary to charge the
Promiss
maker thereof. The report of the case fails to
Note,
Maker,
show whether the note was payable at a parLiability,
ticular place, if so the decision is not in accord
Presentment with the rule in England or the weight of authority in this country: See Sanderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500
(1813), and note thereto in Ames's Cases on Bills and Notes,
Vol. II, p. 1 I. If, on the other hand, the note was not payable at a particular place, then the decision is in accord with
the authorities: Norton v. Fllam, 6 L. J. Ex. 121 (1828);
Laforge v. Jayne, 9 Barr, 410 (1848); but compare Finkbone's
Appea, 86 Pa. 368 (1878). On the other hand, a demand is
necessary in the case of bank notes: Hinsdale v. Lamed, 16
Mass. 65 (1819); certificates of deposit: Fell's Point Inst. v.
W'eedon, 18 Md. 320 (1862); stock subscription notes of
members of a corporation: Bigelow v. Libby, 117 Mass. 359
(1875); and paper payable at a fixed time after demand:
Thorpe v. Booth, Ryan and Moody, 388 (1824.)
That a change in the time of payment of a note, even
though it postpone that time, is such a material alteration
(See Miller v. Gilleland, 19 Pa. I 19, 1852) as will
Time of
Payment,
avoid the note, is not open to question at this
Change
date and has been recently reiterated by the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky in Bank v. Payne, 42 S. W. 736.
NEGLIGENCE.

That it is not the fact that a death occurs, but the circumstances under which it occurs that determines whether there
Dead Body on has been negligence or not, is illustrated by the
Track,
late case in Louisiana of Bryant v. Illinois Cent.
Presumption R. Co., 22 SO. 799, where it was held that the
mere finding of a dead body on the track between the tender
and the switch engine, does not raise the presumption of
negligence on the part of the railroad company.
It was decided in Weber v. iMetropolitan St. Ry. Co., 47 N.
Defective

Y. Suppl. 812, that a passenger standing upon the

Brake
platform is entitled to recover for injuries resulting
from a defective brake upon a car, whereby it became impossible to stop the car before it had collided with another
vehicle.
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The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hone, 38 Atl. 759, was equally
divided on the question whether contributory
Infant,
negligence on the part of the sole next of kin
Suit by
Father,
would prevent a recovery for the death of the
Imputed

deceased, under a statute which gave the right
of action for the benefit of such next of kin. The
facts were that an infant child, four and a-half years of age,
was killed by the alleged negligence of the defendant company.
The father, the sole next of kin, brought this action under the
statute. The company contended that if the death was partly
due to the negligence of the father, there could be no recovery,
although such negligence was not to be imputed to the infant.
It was on this point that the court was divided.
Negligence

The New York Supreme Court decided, in Hunt v. Pitchburg R. Co., 47 N. Y. Suppl. 1034, that great speed is not
Rate of Speed, of itself negligence, but is to be considered in
Signals of determining the adequacy of the warning-of the
Approach
train's approach. Signals of approach may be
so appropriate that the very highest speed would be consistent
with feasonable care.
In Caspers v. Diy Dock & E. B. R. CO., 47 N. Y. Suppl.
961, the New York Supreme Court decided that it was conStanding on tributory negligence for a man to get on a car and
Foot-Board of stand upon the foot-board at the side, whereby he
Car
is struck by the hub of the wheel on a wagon
which the car passes and which he saw when he boarded the
car, there being nothing to prevent him from going inside of
the car.
NUISANCE.

The pollution of a stream through the use of the same by
a municipal corporation for sewerage purposes,
Stream,
thereby rendering the water unfit for domestic
Municipal
purposes and the watering of cattle, is a public
Corporation nuisance: Nolan v. City of New Britain
(Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut), 38 Atl. 703.
Pollution of

The Supreme Court of Missouri has decided that smoke is
not a nuisance "per se; and that that in default of a statute
declaring it to be a nuisance, a city ordinance
Smoke,
City
providing that "The emission into the open air of
Ordinance dense black or thick gray smoke within the corporate limits of the City of St. Louis is hereby declared a
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nuisance," exceeds the powers of the city under its charter
"to- declare, prevent and abate nuisances;" and that such
ordinance is unreasonable and void: Cit , of St. Louis v.
Heit-eberg Packing & Prvaision Co., 42 S. W. 954.
PARTNERSHIP.

In Karrick v. Hanuaman, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, Mr. Justice
Gray delivered an interesting opinion in which he summarized
Dissolution, the law relating to the power of a partner to
Where
dissolve the partnership. When no period of
Articles
Specy
s
duration is specified, the dissolution is no breach
of the partnership agreement. Where a period is
specified, dissolution resulting from the act of one
partner within the time is such a breach. The dissolution is
effective, however, and a chancellor will not restrain it. He
will, if the aggrieved partner so elects, fasten a liability to
account for profits upon the partner who carries on the
business after dissolution. Of course, an action at law for
damages lies for a breach by dissolution as in the case of any
other breach of contract.
In Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. McFadden, 42 S. W. 593, it
appeared that the receiver of railroad A. was operating it and
railroad B.. jointly, the gross receipts being divided
Test of
Partnership, between A. and B. in certain proportions.
Upon
Sharing Gross the finding of these bare facts the Supreme Court
Receipts
of Texas wisely refused to follow the Court of
Definite
Duration

Civil Appeals in holding that the arrangement constituted a
partnership between A. and B. The survival of the old-fashioned test of partnerships-the sharing of net as distinguished
from gross profits-seems to be limited almost entirely to
carrier cases. There is little left of this most unscientific test
in regard to other forms of association. It is true that in
most cases, as in this one, those who merely share gross
receipts are not partners. But it is also true (which the Texas
court seems to forget) that sharing net profits is not decisive
as to the existence of the relation.
REAL PROPERTY.

In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Missouri, a question having arisen as to the liability of the city for damages
for injuries caused to a pedestrian by falling down
Public
Highways,
an excavation in an alleged street, it was ruled
Dedication, that a mere dedication of a street to public use by
Acceptance means of a recorded plan was not alone sufficient
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to render the city liable for failing to keep the same in repair,
but that acceptance of the street as such must be proved. It
was further ruled that proof that such street had long been
used by pedestrians, that one street commissioner had filled
up a hole in it, and that another street commissioner had on
one occasion caused it to be scraped, was sufficient evidence
of acceptance by the city to require the submission of the
question to the jury: Baldwin v. Springfield, 42 S. W. 717.
The occupants of certain lots upon the unsurveyed public
lands of the United States expended some $3o,ooo in buildings
Public Lands, and improvements in the town of Lamar. No steps
Occupants, were ever taken to obtain title to the lots from the
Mining
United States by purchase or otherwise under the
Locations
United States statutes, and it was not shown that
the occupants contemplated taking any such steps. It was
held, however, that such occupants had a possessory right
which was sufficient to entitle them to contest the issuance of
a patent to the claimant of a mining location covering the lots
in question, even when notice of such location was posted on
the ground prior to its occupancy by the town, if at the time
of posting there had been no discovery of the vein or lode
within the limits of the claim located as required by section
2320 of the Revised Statutes: Bonner v. Meikle (Circuit
Court of Nevada), 82 Fed. 697.
The defendant, tenant for years, employed the plaintiff to
make certain alterations in a building to be occupied by defendant as a saloon. The work consisted in wainscotTrade
Fixtures,
Mechanics'
Lien,

Tenant for

Years

ing fastened by screws to strips nailed on the wall,
oak veneering, oak door with casing and frame,

attached to the building, and other work of a
similar character.

It was held that while these

fixtures might be considered trade *fixtures as between landlord and tenant, and therefore removable within the term as
between the plaintiff, a mechanic, and the defendant, the
former was entitled to a lien under the terms of the statute
permitting a lien for work and labor done for alteration and
repair to a building: lVlattlhesen v. Arata (S. C. Oregon), 5o
Pac. 1015.

Where there'is an express devise of realty to trustees to
collect the rents and profits thereof, to keep the property in
repair, etc., such trustees are not liable in their
Trustees,
Liability for official capacity for an injury resulting from a
Tort
negligent failure to repair. Their liability is per-
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sonal, being imposed upon them as holders of the legal title,
which is entirely independent of the equitable title of the beneficiaries: Keating v. Stevenson, 47 N. Y. SuppI. 847.
RECEIVERS.

It has often been decided that orders authorizing receivers
to takeaction are not final and therefore notappealable: Bank v. Anderson, 73 N. W. (Minn.) -75
SURETYSHIP.

One who fraudulently alleges that he is the owner of
property of which really he holds only the legal title, and
thereby qualifies as surety on a bond given
Fraud,
Liability,
to secure the removal of a mechanic's lien, is liable
Contempt
in contempt for his fraud, and will be fined the
amount of the lien and costs-an eminently just decision:
In re Hay Foundry and Iron Works, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 802.
Where an executor has himself appointed guardian of
minors and qualifies and acts as such, his sureties as guardian
Guardian and cannot afterwards claim that his subsequent deWard,
falcation was as executor, not as guardian:
Liability of Gillespie v. Crawford,42 S. W. (Tex.) 62 1, which
surety
also decides (I) that judgment for penalty of bond
is correct, where defalcation has been for a greater amount;
and (2) that one who buys negotiable notes from a guardian
who has no authority to sell is liable to ward if the proceeds
are misappropriated.
WILLS.

Mrs. G., who lived in America prior to 1855, and who had
then gone to Dresden, in Saxony, where she remained until
Devise,
her death in 1888, made a will in 1878, in which
Adopted Child she provided, inter alia, that at the death of E.
(her married daughter, who also lived in Dresden), a certain
share of the residue should go to E.'s " then living lawful
issue." At the date of the will E. was forty years old, and
she and her husband had no issue at the time, but they had
legally adopted a child under, the laws of Saxony, in 1873,
prior to the date of the will. E. died without leaving any
children other than the adopted child in question.
It was held that such adopted child, although entitled to
inherit from its adopting parents, was not entitled to take
under Mrs. G.'s will, after the death of E., under the description "lawful issue," and this whether the devise be construed
under the New York or Saxon Code: New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. iele, 47 N. Y. Suppl. 841.

